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Abstract
A web service can be composed of multiple com-
ponent web services in a loosely-coupled environment.
Traditional Role Based Access Control (RBAC) is in-
adequate for the authorization management of compos-
ite services since the administration of the component
web services has not been taken into consideration. In
this paper, we propose a novel conceptual model, named
as Service Oriented Authorization Control (SOAC) to
facilitate the administration and management for both
service consumers and component web services. A set
of administrative functions are also provided for man-
aging the elements of SOAC. This research will be the
first step towards managing service-oriented authoriza-
tion.
Keywords: Authorization, Conceptual Model, Web
Services, Role Based Access Control.
1 Introduction
Web service technologies provide a technical foun-
dation for seamlessly composing individual component
web services into a cohesive one [1]. However, how to
manage the access on the composite web service be-
comes a challenge in loosely-coupled environment.
Let us look at an example. Tom & Brothers is a
vehicle parts dealer which can provide vehicle engines,
engine accessories, etc, for both military and civil use.
An Order Service is set up in Tom & Brothers includ-
ing five operations: (1) Order Engine, (2) Order Engine
Accessory, (3) Payment, (4) Payment Verification and
(5) Logistics (See Fig. 1). Note, the Logistics operation
is not available to the military customers since they or-
ganize the parts shipment by themselves. When receiv-
ing a part order from a customer, the Tom & Brothers
will order the parts from various other parts suppliers.
As soon as the payment has been verified, the goods
will be transported to the customer.
We can observe the following challenges of manag-
ing authorization for the composite web service-Order
Service in Tom & Brothers:
1. Complicated Coordination on Authoriza-
tion Constraints: Each web service in Tom &
Brothers or other part suppliers bears specific au-
thorization constraints to restrict the access on
its operations. The Order Service is a compos-
ite web service and its operations are supported
by multiple component web services provided by
other part suppliers. It is not enough to enforce
the authorization constraints of the Order Service
without considering the characteristics of these
component services. For example, in Fig. 1, the
operation (1)-Order Engine is supported by the
component web services A, B and C from other
organizations that can provide engine. Hence,
without properly handling the authorization con-
straints of the component web services, the Tom
& Brothers can not ensure if the authorization to
access the specific Order Service’s operations can
be supported. For instance, if the authorization
to access the Order Engine operation has been
assigned to a specific service consumer, but Tom
& Brothers fails to obtain the authorization from
the other component web services, then the op-
eration can not be enacted and the unnecessary
disclosure of Order Engine operation is occurred.
This is the result of lack of coordination on the
authorization constraints in Order Service and its
supporting component web services. Therefore,
granting the access on the Order Service to a ser-
vice consumer needs to consider not only the ser-
vice consumers but also the component services.
We should not only understand ”who should do
what?”, but also need to know ”who should do
what under what conditions”.
2. Dynamicity of Service Environment: Web
services are autonomous and interact with each
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other in a loosely-coupled environment. Many
web services are composed of component services
in a highly dynamic manner. For example, if a
component service changes its authorization con-
straints from asking Tom & Brothers for profes-
sional engineer certificate to requiring sales repre-
sentative qualification, then all the service oper-
ations in Tom & Brothers that can be supported
by the component web service need to update their
identifications on the component service’s autho-
rization constraints. Moreover, there are huge
amounts of web services that can provide the same
or similar operations. For example, in Fig. 1, com-
ponent services A, B, and N can all support the
same type of engine accessories to Tom & Broth-
ers. Hence, if the changes occur frequently and/or
happen in thousands of web services, then an effi-
cient way to administrate these changes is needed.
At this stage, the dynamicity of web Service im-
pedes the efficiency of service-oriented authoriza-
tion management.
3. Conflict of Interest:
There are different kinds of conflicts of interest
which are crucial in the authorization of compos-
ite web services. For example, when there is a
conflict of interest between a specific service con-
sumer and a specific component service, the Order
Service in Tom & Brothers should not be autho-
rized to the service consumer when this component
service is needed in the composite service, e.g.,
USA military customers have a conflict of inter-
est with a component web service from a Chinese
part supplier. Actually, the conflicts of interest
associated with characteristics of component ser-
vices have not been touched in existing research
about web services authorization.
Therefore, an effective management on service-
oriented authorization by coordinating the constraints
in different web services is needed. Role Based Access
Control (RBAC) [2] is a widely accepted approach to
restrict system access to authorized users. In RBAC,
users acquire permissions through their roles rather
than they are assigned permissions directly. This
greatly reduces the administrative overhead associated
with individual users and permissions.
However, web services technologies facilitate the in-
tegration of the loosely-coupled distributed applica-
tions. There may be a large amount of component
web services which are used as resources to support
the composite web service’s operations. The quantity
of service consumers can also be large. As illustrated in
Fig. 1, the system of the composite web service (Order
Service) needs to deal with not only a large number
of users (service consumers) but also great amounts of
resources (component services). Moreover, the char-
acteristics of these resources are different from that of
objects of RBAC in close systems. These resources
do not belong to the concerned system, but the sys-
tem can reach their requirements and provided oper-
ations. Hence, traditional RBAC is not suitable for
the service-oriented authorization management since it
has not taken the Resource into account. Note the Re-
source particulary can not be fully controlled in the
context of service environment.
All existing role-based models in web service
paradigm have not brought the administration of re-
source into the picture. Actually, the quantity of re-
sources can be very large and they can be prone-to-
change, which should be considered in web service au-
thorization. In research work [4, 6, 7], roles are as-
signed to service consumers for service authorization.
However all these researches have not put the resource
into the picture or they simply employ an unrealistic
assumption that there is a global coordination on in-
ternal authorization policies of each autonomous web
services to enforce the access control in service compo-
sition.
In this paper, we propose an innovative conceptual
model for authorization of web services, named as Ser-
vice Oriented Authorization Control (SOAC). The con-
ceptual model will handle the web service authorization
by dealing with not only a large number of service con-
sumers, but also huge amounts of resources. Autho-
rization constraints of the component web service and
its supported composite web service are integrated to-
gether for making authorization decision to a service
consumer. Furthermore, administrative functions are
also presented to enforce the web service authorization
from a system perspective.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section
2 describes the conceptual model with the major fea-
tures and detailed specifications. Section 3 discusses
the administrative functions. Section 4 overviews some
related work. Concluding remarks and discussion of fu-
ture work are presented in Section 5.
2 Conceptual Model of Service Ori-
ented Authorization Control
We propose a novel conceptual model, named as Ser-
vice Oriented Authorization Control (SOAC) for man-
aging the access on the composite web service (See
Fig. 2). Based on the proposed conceptual model,
the elements of service authorization and their inter-
nal relationships can be systematically described. We
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Figure 1. Order Service in Tom & Brothers
develop the SOAC conceptual model by using the no-
tation of Entity-Relationship (E-R) Diagram. In
Fig. 2, the rectangles represent the elements and the
diamonds illustrate the relationships.
2.1 Features of Service Oriented Autho-
rization Control
In SOAC, the authorization management concerns
two parts as service provision part (See grey rectangle
in Fig. 2) and service realization part (See white rect-
angle in Fig. 2). In service provision part, the concept
of Role is employed for handling with the administra-
tion and management of profiles of service consumers.
A role will be assigned to a specific service consumer to
gain certain permissions for accessing the operations of
the composite web service, if the service consumer can
satisfy the authorization constraints of the composite
web service. For example, a web service consumer can
be identified as USA military customer to obtain per-
missions to access all operations of the Order Service
in Tom & Brothers except the Logistics operation, if it
bears the certification from Pentagon. In a summary,
role in SOAC is used to encapsulate a group of web
service consumers that can satisfy the common autho-
rization constraints of the composite web service.
Following the same philosophy of roles for service
consumer’s profiles, the conceptual model introduces
Resource Type to deal with the large number of the
component services (resources). In service realization
part, the design of resource type is based on the char-
acteristics and authorization constraints of the com-
ponent services. In SOAC, resource type is used to
represent a group of resources that bear common au-
thorization constraints and can provide same support
to the composite web service. From the motivating ex-
ample, the Order Engine operation in Tom & Broth-
ers requires the support from the resource type named
as Engine Supplier that contains the component web
services A, B, and C which can provide engine (See
Fig. 1). Obviously, one resource type can include mul-
tiple resources, and vise versa.
The reasons to introduce the resource type in SOAC
are: (1) the authorization to a service consumer to ac-
cess the composite web service’s operations relies on
not only the profile of the service consumer but also
the characteristics and authorization constraints of the
component web services; (2) resource type is more con-
stant compared with individual resources. It is easy for
the composite web service to map its operations with
resource type than individual resource which are dy-
namic in loosely-coupled environment. For example,
if one resource changes its authorization constraints
to be in another resource type, then the composite
web service only need to transfer the resource from
this resource type to another one. It is not neces-
sary to change the relationship between the resource
types and the supported composite web service’s op-
erations. Without resource type, the composite web
service has to update all relationships between this re-
source and the involved composite service’s operations.
If the change is frequent and the affected resources and
operations are countless, then the workload to spec-
ify the change individually will be huge. Therefore,
resource type is particularly necessary in service ori-
ented environment where the resources are thousands
and very dynamic, and the relationships between the
resources and their supported operations are loosely-
coupled.
2.2 Specification of Service Oriented Au-
thorization Control
In this section, we introduce the specification of
SOAC from three perspectives, (1) service provision
part, (2) service realization part, and (3) integration of
these two parts.
2.2.1 Specification of Service Provision Part
A typical authorization constraint of the composite web
service requires that only the service consumer that can
fulfill the composite service’s constraints, e.g., bear-
ing specific credential, can be assigned with specific
roles to gain the permissions to access the operations of
the composite web service (See Constraint enacted be-
tween the elements of Role (R) and Service Consumer
(SC) in Fig. 2). In Fig. 2, we define service consumer
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as the element that requires to access the composite
web service’s operations. To avoid confusion between
the accessed composite web service’s operation with
the element of Operation used in traditional RBAC,
we introduce a new element-function to represent the
composite web service’s operations. The function can
be represented by one composite service’s operation or
several operations. Since there is only one type of per-
mission for service consumer to act on the composite
web service’s function in service environment - ”exe-
cute the function”, we ignore the permission in SOAC.
Since service consumer is prone to change, and its
quantity is vary large, directly specifying the assign-
ment of function to individual service consumer needs
tedious administration effort. In SOAC conceptual
model, we follow the philosophy of RBAC to have the
more constant concept-role to encapsulate the service
consumers which can fulfill the common authorization
constraints of the composite web service. A role will
be assigned to each service consumer based on its char-
acteristics (typically a credential that service consumer
submits to the composite web service). Each role binds
with a group of functions that can be accessed. The
roles guarantee that the composite web service’s func-
tions can only be accessed by the qualified service con-
sumers as specific roles. In a summary, what we are
concerned in SOAC is "who should act on what as
what kind of role". Here below, we present the for-
mal definition of service provision part of SOAC.
Definition 1 The service provision part of SOAC in-
cludes:
• SC, R ,and F are elements representing Service
Consumer, Role, and Function.
• SCA ⊆ SC × R, a many-to-many rela-
tion to map service consumer to role assign-
ment. Formally, ∀sc∈SC, ∀r∈R, (sc, r)∈SCA ⇒
sc.credential = r.credential, where the creden-
tial that the service consumer submits is consistent
with the credential that the role requires.
• assigned sc:(r:R) → 2SC , the mapping of role
r onto a set of service consumers. Formally, as-
signed sc(r)={sc∈SC|(sc, r)∈SCA}.
• PFA ⊆F×R, a many-to-many relation to map
function to role assignment.
• assigned fun:(r:R) → 2F , the mapping of
role r onto a set of functions. Formally, as-
signed fun(r)={f∈F | (f, r) ∈PFA}.
Figure 2. Service Oriented Authorization
Control (SOAC) Conceptual Model
2.2.2 Specification of Service Realization Part
When a composite web service receives the authoriza-
tion request from a service consumer, at first it needs to
confirm if the realization of the required functions can
be supported by specific type of the component web
service, i.e., resources. Due to the feature of Dynam-
icity of the component web service, it is unrealistic for
the composite service to specify the relationships be-
tween the resources and the supported composite web
service’s function individually, if the resources and the
functions are numerous. Hence, the concept resource
type is introduced in SOAC. The resource type is a
set of resources defined by the composite service after
identifying the characteristics and authorization con-
straints of the resources (See Fig.2). The composite
web service can bear multiple resource types that in-
clude many resources. The resource therefore can be
used to support the function if the function is mapped
with the resource type that contains the correspond-
ing resource. The resource type can contain the re-
sources if the authorization constraints of the resources
can be satisfied by the resource type and the support
that the resource can provide is what the resource
type needs (See Constraint between the elements of
Resource Type (ReT) and Resource (Re) in Fig. 2).
Here below, we present the formal definition of service
realization part of SOAC.
Definition 2 The service realization part of SOAC in-
cludes:
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• F, ReT, and Re are elements representing Func-
tion, Resource Type, and Resource.
• SFA ⊆ F × ReT, a many-to-many relation to
map function to resource type.
• assigned ret:(ret:ReT) → 2F , the mapping of
resource type ret onto a set of functions. For-
mally, assigned ret(ret)={f∈F|(f, ret)∈SFA}.
• RTA ⊆Re×ReT, a many-to-many relation to
map resource to resource type. Formally, ∀re∈Re,
∀ret∈ReT, (re, ret)∈RTA ⇒ re.constraint =
ret.constraint, where the constraint that restricts
the access on the resource is consistent with the
constraint that the resource type can fulfill.
• assigned re:(ret:ReT) → 2Re, the mapping of
resource type ret onto a set of resources. Formally,
assigned re(ret)={re∈Re|(re, ret)∈RTA}.
2.2.3 Specification of Integration of Two Parts
in SOAC
In previous two sub sections, we have introduced the el-
ements and their relationships in service provision part
and service realization part of SOAC. These two parts
are logically correlated with each other and are re-
quired to be integrated together at runtime for service-
oriented authorization.
In Fig. 2, the mappings between the elements of Role
(R), Function (F) and Recourse Type (ReT) logically
integrate the service provision part and service real-
ization part together. Hence, the access on the com-
posite web service can be assigned to service consumer
if the constraints of the composite web service and its
resources can both be satisfied, i.e., the service con-
sumer in service provision part can be assigned with a
specific role to access the functions if the correspond-
ing functions can be supported by the relative resource
type which includes specific resources in service real-
ization part. We summarize the authorization rules in
Lemma 1:
Lemma 1 Authorization to access the composite web
service’s functions can be granted to service consumer
in service composition if:
(1) The service consumer can satisfy the authorization
constraints of the composite web service.
(2) The resource type can satisfy the authorization con-
straints of the resources (the component web services).
(3) The functions that the role needs to access can be
logically supported by the resource type.
Here below we introduce each condition of Lemma 1
in detail. In condition (1), it stresses the constraints
enacted between the elements of Service Consumer
(SC) and Role (R) shown in Fig. 2: ”only service con-
sumer that can satisfy the authorization constraints
of the composite service can be assigned as specific
role”. On the other hand, Condition (2) is used to re-
strict the relationships between Resource Type (ReT)
and Resource (Re). It states that the resource type
can only include the resource whose authorization con-
straints can be satisfied by the resource type. Further-
more, condition (3) emphasizes that the function that
the resource type can support should be what the role
needs to access (See Constraint among the relation-
ships between the elements of Role (R), Function (F)
and Resource Type (ReT) in Fig. 2). For instance,
if the function that a service consumer needs to access
represents Order Engine operation in Tom & Brothers,
then the resource type deployed in SOAC should be
Engine Suppler that can logically support the func-
tion, i.e. the resource type includes the specific re-
sources that can provide engine to Tom & Brothers.
In Fig. 2, another element Session is introduced in
SOAC to integrate the two parts of SOAC together at
runtime. There are two types of sessions in SOAC, In-
dependent session (ISe) and Compound session (CSe).
When service consumer starts to send message to the
composite web service by using its functions with spe-
cific assigned roles, the service consumer and its ac-
tivated roles are included in one independent session.
When the message arrives at the composite web service,
the composite service thereby needs to use the support-
ing resources for processing the message. We believe
that the resource type is activated when the message is
passed from the composite web service to the specific
resources that belong to the resource type. At that
time, a compound session is created by combining the
resource type and supported function with the corre-
sponding service consumer and activated role. Note,
the resource type and the supported function can not
be included in the independent session, since a compos-
ite web service can not use the resource type without
receiving the message from the service consumer. Here
below we present the formal definition of Session at
integration of two parts in SOAC.
Definition 3 The integration of two parts in SOAC
includes:
• Session includes two types, Independent Session
(ISe) and Compound Session (CSe), where:
– Independent Session (ISe) is used by ser-
vice consumer sc to map the set of activated
roles {r1..rj}, j≥1.
– Compound Session (CSe) is used by a
group of service consumer and function <
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sc, f >, where service consumer sc requires
to access the functions of the composite web
service f, to map a set of activated roles and
resource types {< r1, ret1 >..< rj, retk >},
where:
◦ r1..rj, j≥1, is a subset of roles assigned
to and activated by the specific service
consumer sc.
◦ ret1..retk, k≥1 is a subset of resource
type assigned and activated to support the
specific function f.
• Service Consumer Independent Session:
SCSi:(sc:SC)→2ISe, the mapping of service con-
sumer sc onto a set of independent sessions ISe.
• Service Consumer Compound Session:
SCSc : (sc : SC)→ 2CSe, the mapping of ser-
vice consumer sc onto a set of compound sessions
CSe.
• Role Independent Session: RSi:(sei:ISe)→
2R, the mapping of independent session sei onto a
set of roles.
• Role Compound Session: RSc : (sec : CSe) →
2R, the mapping of compound session sec onto a
set of roles.
• Function Session: FS(f:F)→2CSe, the mapping
of function f onto a set of compound session CSe.
• Resource Type Session:RTS(sec:CSe) →2ReT ,
the mapping of compound session sec onto a set of
resource types.
3 Administrative Functions of SOAC
In this section, we present the administrative func-
tions of SOAC to outline the semantics of various ad-
ministrative operations. They are required for main-
taining the SOAC conceptual model components, e.g.,
the element sets and relations. We also take the Ses-
sion into consideration to manage the activation of the
specific elements. Three categories of administrative
operations are presented: (1) Service Provision Ad-
ministrative Operation (SP −AO); (2) Service Real-
ization Administrative Operation (SR−AO); and (3)
Session Administration Operation (SE − AO). The
notation used to formalize the administrative opera-
tions is basically a subset of the Z notation. The rep-
resentation schema in the formal specification of the
administrative operations is:
Schema−Name(Declaration)  Predicate; ...; Predicate .
Table 1. Service Provision Administrative Op-













All the data types and operations used in the formal
specification are defined in SOAC definition in previ-
ous Section. NAME is an abstract data type used to
represent the identifiers of the elements in SOAC.
3.1 Service Provision Administrative
Operation- SP −AO
There are three elements in service provision part of
SOAC-Service Consumer (SC), Role (R), and Func-
tion (F), and two relationships among the elements-
Assign and Grant (See grey rectangle in Fig. 2). Hence,
SP −AO are separated into two aspects SP −AOele
and SP −AOrela to manage the elements and rela-
tionships respectively.
The operations (1)∼(6) (See Table. 1) are
SP −AOele used to add and delete elements in
service provision part. Due to space limit, we only
take the operation (4) as example. In operation (4),
an existing role is deleted. If the role is activated by
the specific service consumer in independent session or
compound session, then the associated session should
be deleted firstly. Furthermore, the mapping functions
and relations associated with the deleted role also
need to update to erase the effect of this role. Then
the role can be deleted from the set R.
(4) DeleteRole(role:NAME)
role∈R;
[∀ sei ∈ISe • role ∈ RSi(sei)⇒
DeleteIndependentSession(sei)];
[∀ sec ∈CSe • role ∈ RSc(sec)⇒
DeleteCompoundSession(sec)];












The operations (7)∼(10) (See Table. 1) are
SP −AOrela used to add and delete relationships in
service provision part. For example, Operation (9) are
used to create the relationships between the elements










3.2 Service Realization Administrative
Operation- SR−AO
There are also three elements included in SR−AO-
Function (F), and Resource Type (ReT), and Re-
source (Re). However, the element of function has
already mentioned in previous sub section. We only
introduce the two elements left in SR−AOele. More-
over, two relationships-Support and Contain are in-
cluded in SR−AOrela (See white rectangle in Fig. 2).
Operations (11)∼(14) (See Table. 2) are used to cre-
ate and delete elements of resource type and resource.
They follow the same rules enacted in SP −AOele.
Operations (15)∼(18) (See Table. 2) aim to create
and delete the relationships-Support and Contain in
service realization part by using the same rules in
SP −AOrela.
3.3 Session Administrative Operation-
SE − AO
SE −AO is used to maintain the element of
Session and associated relationships, which reflects
the activation of the corresponding elements. Four
commands are developed in SE − AOele based on the
creation and deletion of two types of Session (See
Operations (19)∼(22) in Table. 3). The operations
(23)-(34) are SE − AOrela used to maintain (add
and delete) the six relationships associated with the
element of session (See Fig. 2). Due to space limit, we
do not list the twelve operations of SE − AOrela in
Table 3. Let us take the operation (21) as an example
to illustrate the SE − AO. Operation (21) is used to
create a compound session. Firstly, an ars is created












which represents the activated roles and resource types
included in this new compound session. The mapping
functions SCSc(serviceConsumer) and FS(function)
are also updated to reflect the new compound session.
Finally, the RSc(sec) and RTS(sec) are updated to
point to the activated roles and resource types from

























In [2, 3], a basic Role-based Access Control (RBAC)
model is presented. The security policy in RBAC
does not directly grant permissions to users but to
appropriate roles. However, traditional RBAC model
is only suitable for authorization management within
individual organization. In RBAC, the resource that
is required to support the function is not considered,
since it is assumed as a constant concept, which quan-
tity is small, and can be fixed in advance and less
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changed. However, in loosely-coupled environment, re-
source that is needed to support the function spreads
across-organizational boundary and is composed in
highly dynamic fashion. Hence, the dynamicity of re-
source in service environment makes the authorization
management complicated. Research has been done in
service composition security by enhancing RBAC. We
shall look into some representative works in the area .
In [4, 5], the authors provide an enforcement and
verification approach to guarantee that a service chore-
ography can be successfully implemented between a
set of web services (service consumer and composite
web service), based on their authorization constraints.
However, the paper did not mention how to manage
the access control after the authorization constraints
of the composite web service are satisfied. The au-
thorization constraints of the supporting resources are
totally ignored.
The authors in [6, 7] propose an approach to corre-
late the local role issued by the individual component
service with the global role generated from the com-
posite services. However, the ”role” as a concept used
by specific service to manage the authorization is part
of internal security policy within each web service and
can not be identified by the other services. Hence, the
mapping of the global role with the local role is not real-
istic. In SOAC, we introduce the resource type (ReT)
as the composite web service’s acknowledgment on the
public authorization constraints of the resources.
Although plenty of existing enhanced RBAC mech-
anisms and approaches have been presented which fo-
cus on managing access control in service composition,
they are still insufficient in: (1) missing the adminis-
tration of the resources in service-oriented authoriza-
tion; (2) ignoring the dynamicity of service environ-
ment where the composite web service is composed of
resources based on-demand; (3) hard coding the roles
issued from resources and composite service together.
In this paper, we present an innovative conceptual
model, SOAC, to manage the service-oriented autho-
rization. The merits of SOAC lie in: (1) the coordina-
tion of the authorization constraints of composite web
services and component web services; and (2) the in-
troduction of the more constant concepts of role and
resource type to represent the concepts of service con-
sumer and resource which are dynamic and volatile.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
This research work provides an extension of clas-
sical RBAC approach with the capability to address
the authorization issues of the composite web service,
brought in by the large number of dynamic service












consumers and component web services. A novel con-
ceptual model has been developed for managing the
service-oriented authorization in the loosely-coupled
environment of web services. Beyond the existing ap-
proaches for web services authorization, our approach
considers the authorization constraints of the compo-
nent web services explicitly. Three categories of ad-
ministrative functions of SOAC are also proposed.
In the future, we will develop mechanisms to elab-
orate the causes and solutions regarding to conflicts
of interest in web service authorization. Detailed and
formalized authorization constraints in SOAC and a
context-aware extension will also be studied.
References
[1] M. Papazoglou, D. Georgakopoulos.: Service-Oriented
Computing. Communications of the ACM 46(10)
(2003) 25–28.
[2] RS. Sandhu, E. Coyne, H. Feinstein, C. Youman.: Role-
based Access Control Models. IEEE Computer 29(2)
(1996) 38–47.
[3] D. Ferraiolo, J. Cugini, R. Kuhn.: Role Based Access
Control: Features and Motivations. In: Proceedings of
ACSAC. (1995).
[4] M. Mecella, M. Ouzzani, F. Paci, and E. Bertino.: Ac-
cess Control Enforcement for Conversation-based Web
Service. in Proceedings of the International World Wide
Web Conference, (2006), 257–266.
[5] F. Paci, M. Ouzzani, and M. Mecella.: Verification of
Access Control Requirements In Web Servies Choreog-
raphy. in Proceedings of SCC, (2008), 5–12.
[6] R. Wonohoesodo, and Z. Tari.: A Role Based Ac-
cess Control for Web Services. in Proceedings of SCC,
(2004), 49–56.
[7] J. Fischer, and R. Majumdar.: A Theorey of Role Com-
position. in Proceedings of ICWS, (2008), 49–56.
553
